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Humans and other primates share many decision biases, among them our subjective distortion 2 
of objective probabilities. When making choices between uncertain rewards, we typically treat 3 
probabilities non-linearly: overvaluing low probabilities of reward, and undervaluing high ones. A 4 
growing body of evidence, however, points to a more flexible pattern of distortion than the classical 5 
inverse-S one, highlighting the effect of experimental conditions in shifting the weight assigned to 6 
probabilities, such as task feedback, learning, and attention. Here we investigated the role of 7 
sequence structure – the order in which gambles are presented in a choice task – in shaping the 8 
probability distortion patterns of rhesus macaques. We presented two male monkeys with binary 9 
choice sequences of MIXED or REPEATED gambles against safe rewards. Parametric modeling 10 
revealed that choices in each sequence type were guided by significantly different patterns of 11 
probability distortion. Whereas we elicited the classical inverse-S shaped probability distortion in 12 
pseudorandomly MIXED trial sequences of gamble-safe choices, we found the opposite pattern 13 
consisting of S-shaped distortion, with REPEATED sequences. We extended these results to 14 
binary choices between two gambles, without a safe option, and confirmed the unique influence 15 
of the sequence structure in which the animals make choices. Finally, we showed that the value 16 
of past experienced gambles had a significant impact on the subjective value of future ones, 17 
shaping probability distortion on a trial-by-trial basis. Taken together, our results suggest that 18 
differences in choice sequence are sufficient to reverse the direction of probability distortion.  19 
 20 
Significance Statement 21 
Our lives are peppered with uncertain, probabilistic choices. Recent studies showed dynamic 22 
subjective weighting of probability. In the present study, we show that probability distortions in 23 
macaque monkeys differ significantly between sequences in which single gambles are repeated 24 
(S-shaped distortion), as opposed to being pseudorandomly intermixed with other gambles 25 
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(inverse-S shaped distortion). Our findings challenge the idea of fixed probability distortions 26 
resulting from inflexible computations, and points to a more instantaneous evaluation of 27 
probabilistic information. Past trial outcomes appeared to drive the ‘gap’ between probability 28 
distortions in different conditions. Our data suggest that probability values are slowly but 29 
constantly updated from prior experience – like in most adaptive systems – driving measures of 30 
probability distortion to either side of the S/inverse-S debate. 31 
 32 
Introduction 33 
Choices between uncertain rewards require decision-makers to evaluate each option along 34 
multiple dimensions. At the very least, a decision-maker needs to simultaneously consider the 35 
quantity and probability of a reward’s occurrence if he is to evaluate its attractiveness in relation 36 
to other choice prospects. The von Neumann and Morgenstern utility theorem, commonly referred 37 
to as Expected Utility (EU) theory, was the first axiomatic model of rational behavior capable of 38 
describing people’s choices in these situations (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). EU theory 39 
rigorously introduced the concept of utility as a representation of a decision-maker’s subjective 40 
value for an objective reward quantity. Through the metric of utility, EU theory was able to describe 41 
different risk attitudes, like the risk-seeking behavior of a gambler or the risk aversion of an 42 
insurance buyer; it was, however, soon challenged by the various experimental results of 43 
behavioral economics (for review see e.g., Machina, 1987; Starmer, 2000; Weber & Camerer, 44 
1987). Attempts to resolve some of these challenges led to the development of several 45 
generalized expected utility theories, many of which (notably prospect theory, rank-dependent 46 
utility theory and cumulative prospect theory) incorporated the concept of probability distortion 47 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Quiggin, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). While maintaining the 48 
non-linear relationship between subjective utility and objective reward magnitudes, these theories 49 
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made use of subjective probability weightings, or probability distortions, to account for the idea 50 
that reward probabilities were also treated non-linearly during choice.  51 
Experimental measures of probability distortion in humans and monkeys typically show that while 52 
small probabilities tend to be overweighted by decision-makers, large probabilities are instead 53 
underweighted (Gonzalez & Wu, 1999; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; W. R. Stauffer, Lak, 54 
Bossaerts, & Schultz, 2015). There is, however, dramatic variation in this pattern of distortion 55 
across both different subjects (Bruhin, Fehr-Duda, & Epper, 2010; Burke et al., 2018; Gonzalez 56 
& Wu, 1999) and between different task contexts (Farashahi, Azab, Hayden, & Soltani, 2018; 57 
Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004; Wu, Delgado, & Maloney, 2009). While the causes of such 58 
variability have yet to be identified, differences in probability distortions could relate to the way in 59 
which probability information is presented to decision-makers (Hertwig et al., 2004), or the way in 60 
which probability knowledge is acquired and stored by the decision-maker (Camilleri & Newell, 61 
2013). Some studies suggested that prospect theory might, altogether, be incapable of explaining 62 
differences in risk attitudes across these contexts (Kellen, Pachur, & Hertwig, 2016).  63 
Here we investigated the role of choice context, specifically sequential structures, as a possible 64 
source of probability distortion variability in rhesus macaques: animals known to show quantifiable 65 
and reproducible probability distortions (W. R. Stauffer et al., 2015). To achieve this, we first 66 
measured the certainty equivalents (CE) of specific gambles, defined as the amount of reward for 67 
which the animal was choice-indifferent with regards to said gambles; the CE therefore indicated 68 
the subjective value of the gamble in the ‘currency’ of the safe reward. We then simultaneously 69 
estimated the contributions of utility and probability distortion to these subjective values, allowing 70 
us to model the shape of the monkeys’ probability distortion independently from utility.  71 
We used this technique to investigate the possible influence of trial sequence structure on the 72 
shape of the probability distortion in two different task situations: randomly intermixing the trials 73 
required for the CE measurements of all gambles simultaneously, or determining the CEs of 74 
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different gambles via separate blocks of trials. We performed an out-of-sample test to validate 75 
and extend the results of our main task, and investigated the contribution of the trial history as a 76 
possible correlate of probability distortion variance. Our data showed that a change in the 77 
presentation order of probability information indeed altered the observed probability distortion 78 
pattern, inducing a reversal in probability distortion shape. 79 
 80 
Materials and Methods 81 
Animals and Experimental Setup 82 
Two male rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) were used in this study (11.2kg and 13.2kg). 83 
During experiments, the monkeys sat in a primate chair (Crist Instruments) and made choices 84 
between rewarding stimuli presented on a computer monitor positioned 30cm in front of them. 85 
The animals reported their choices between options with a left-right motion joystick (Biotronix 86 
workshop, Cambridge). Joystick position and task event times were sampled and stored at 1kHz 87 
on a Windows 7 computer running custom-made software written in MATLAB (The MathWorks, 88 
Natick, MA) using Psychtoolbox (v3.0.11). All experimental protocols were assessed and 89 
approved by the Home Office of the United Kingdom. 90 
Experimental Design 91 
We trained the monkeys to associate visual stimuli with specific juice rewards that varied along 92 
two dimensions: the quantity of juice delivered (reward magnitude, m), and the delivery probability 93 
of the reward (reward probability, p). To capture both dimensions descriptively, the visual stimuli 94 
consisted of a horizontal bar or of a pair of horizontal bars framed between two vertical framing 95 
lines. The vertical position of the horizontal bars signaled the magnitude of juice delivered; the 96 
width of the bar signaled the probability of their delivery from no bar (no reward) to touching the 97 
frame on both side (certain reward). To ensure that the bar edge position was not used as a cue 98 
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for the gamble’s mathematical expected value (EV), i.e. the product of m and p, the bars were 99 
randomly shifted horizontally on each trial. This guaranteed that magnitude and probability 100 
information were independently presented and used to make choices. Multiple partial bars found 101 
between the vertical frames signaled gambles between ‘risky’ rewards, while a singular, full width 102 
horizontal bar signaled a safe, riskless reward. Across all trials, monkeys experienced rewards 103 
ranging from 0 ml to 0.5 ml in 0.05 ml increments, and gamble probabilities varying between 0.1 104 
and 1 in decimal increments (0.1). 105 
The animals learned to associate rewards and magnitudes with the visual stimuli schema through 106 
more than 5000 single-outcome, or imperative, trials. For these trials, only one option was 107 
presented on either side of the screen. To obtain the cued reward, the animals were required to 108 
select the side on which the reward was presented. All reward options were repeated on both the 109 
left and right sides of the computer screen, alternating pseudorandomly to control for any side-110 
preference. 111 
Following imperative training, we presented the animals with a binary choice paradigm where they 112 
had to choose one of two reward options presented simultaneously. Most binary choice trials 113 
pitted a safe reward against a gamble. All gambles consisted of two probabilistic rewards: the 114 
monkey could either get a fixed 0.5 ml of juice with probability p, or 0 ml of juice with probability 1 115 
- p. Safe options varied in terms of reward magnitude only. In separate sets of trials, we presented 116 
the animals with choices between two gambles with two outcomes each (possible outcomes: 0 117 
ml, 0.25 ml, 0.5 ml). In these trials, one of the gambles could have two non-zero outcomes (0.25 118 
ml and 0.5 ml). In all cases, reward was delivered probabilistically, matching the probabilities cued 119 
by each stimulus. Trials began with a white cross at the center of a black screen, followed by the 120 
appearance of a joystick-driven cursor. The cursor had to be moved to the center cross in order 121 
for a trial to begin. After successfully maintaining the cursor on the central cross for 0.5 to 1 s, two 122 




trials, only one option appeared while the other side remained dark. The animal had 3 seconds to 124 
convey his decision by moving the joystick to the selected side, after which the unselected option 125 
would disappear. The animal’s response time (RT), i.e. the time interval between the cues 126 
appearance and the beginning of the joystick movement, was collected for individual trials. 127 
Reward delivery occurred after the holding time (0.1 s to 0.2 s), and the selected option lingered 128 
on the screen for 1 s post reward delivery to reinforce stimulus-reward associations with visual 129 
feedback. A variable inter-trial period of 1 to 1.5 s (blank screen) led to the next trial onset. 130 
Unsuccessful central hold, side selection hold, or trials where no choices were made resulted in 131 
a 6 s timeout for the animal, after which the trial would be repeated. 132 
Psychometric Elicitation of Certainty Equivalents  133 
The likelihood of a monkey choosing a specific, individual gamble over different safe options was 134 
assessed through the binary choice paradigm (Fig. 1b). The resulting choice ratios were then 135 
used to fit a logistic sigmoid function, or psychometric curve, to estimate choice likelihoods for 136 
every possible safe-gamble pairing within the tested reward range.  137 
P(ChooseSafe) =  1/(1 + e
−(




These psychometric curve captured the likelihood of choosing a safe option over a gamble 139 
through two free parameters: x0, measuring the x-position of the curve’s inflection point, and σ, 140 
the function’s temperature parameter, reflecting the steepness of the curve. Importantly, only 141 
sequences that contained choices between a gamble and a minimum of three different safe 142 
options (repeated at least 4 times) were used in the analysis. 143 
The point of choice indifference between gamble and safe options, corresponding to the inflection 144 
point x0 of the resulting model, represented a gamble’s certainty equivalent (CE): the certain safe 145 
reward that was of equal subjective value to the gamble. CEs could then be used to categorize 146 
behavior. Gambles where the CEs were of greater value than the predicted EV signaled risk-147 
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seeking behavior for that gamble’s probability value. Gambles with CEs lower than their EVs 148 
indicated risk-averse behavior for that option. For cases where CEs were equal to EVs, the 149 
animals were seen as being risk-neutral. 150 
To explore the role of task structure on the variability of one’s probability distortion pattern, we 151 
measured CEs in one of two elicitation conditions: MIXED or REPEATED trial sequences (Fig. 152 
1c,d,e). In the case of MIXED sequences, multiple CEs were elicited through single blocks of 153 
randomized choice trials involving different gambles and safe options. Such blocks were repeated 154 
until each gamble-safe pair had been presented a minimum of 4 times each. In the case of 155 
REPEATED sequences, CEs were elicited using blocks of trials that contained a unique gamble. 156 
These REPEATED trial blocks pitted multiple safe options against a single gamble for the 157 
elicitation sequence. Other than these sequence designs, everything from visual cues to 158 
timescales was identical. The only difference between elicitation conditions was the number of 159 
different probabilities of reward (gambles) experienced within a trial block. Testing for each 160 
elicitation condition was done consecutively over multiple days, with each monkey receiving 161 
imperative training before their daily elicitation sessions. We collected on average 172.95 ± 20.24 162 
(SEM) trials per daily session over 56 sessions for monkey A (22 REPEATED and 34 MIXED 163 
sessions, in consecutive days), and 414.63 ± 27.87 trials over 59 sessions for monkey B (31  164 
REPEATED and 28 MIXED sessions, in consecutive days). 165 
Analysis of Behavioral Data 166 
All data were collected, stored, and analyzed using custom MATLAB and Python (SciPy 1.1.0: 167 
Oliphant, 2007) software. Analyses were run on trial-by-trial choice data, and on the CEs elicited 168 
psychometrically from these trial-by-trial choices. The data were stored and analyzed separately 169 




Before any comparative analyses, the use of visual stimuli to guide the monkeys’ decision 171 
behavior was verified through analyzing all CE elicitation trials (excluding error trials where the 172 
animals made no choices) in a logistic regression model: 173 
𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑉𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒) + 𝛽2(𝑉𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒) + 𝛽4(𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘) + 𝛽3(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐿𝑅) +   174 
The dependent variable took a value of y = 1 if the gamble was chosen and y = 0 if the safe option 175 
was chosen instead. As had been previously done (W. R. Stauffer et al., 2015), we fitted four 176 
independent variables: option values (Vgamble, Vsafe) were defined as the EV of gamble and safe 177 
rewards; gamble position (PositionLR) as 0 for left, 1 for right screen side; and the outcome’s risk 178 
value was defined as √ 𝑝 ∗ (1 − 𝑝), a proportional representation of probabilistic variance. We 179 
fitted individual testing days separately, fully standardizing the β-coefficients and then testing for 180 
statistical significance (one sample t-test, p<0.05) in order to identify relevant decision variables. 181 
Positive regression coefficients indicated an increase in the likelihood of choosing a gamble over 182 
a safe option with increasing independent variable value; negative regression coefficients 183 
indicated a decrease in the likelihood of choosing the gamble.  184 
Once the use of onscreen stimuli to guide choices had been confirmed, CEs were measured using 185 
the aformentioned psychometric fit (see Psychometric Elicitation of Certainty Equivalents). CEs 186 
gathered in the MIXED condition were compared with CEs gathered under the REPEATED 187 
condition using a two-factor ANOVA with gamble probability and elicitation condition as main 188 
factors. The ANOVA also captured any interaction between the two factors, highlighting any 189 
condition effects present at a sequence level. 190 
We pooled trial-by-trial choices to parametrically model the respective effects of utility and 191 
probability distortion on single choices, and more generally, on the subjective value of gambles 192 
(CEs). For each daily testing session, we simultaneously estimated both the utility and probability 193 






described choices between gamble-safe pairs were elicited in this way, capturing the individual 195 
effects of non-linear utility and probability distortion. The model ran on trial-by-trial choice data, 196 
with data binned into several sets containing one gamble and all safe options presented against 197 
it on the day (CE elicitation sequence). The discrete choice (softmax) function returned the 198 
probability of choosing the gamble option based on the subjective value of both the gamble (VG) 199 
and the safe reward presented (VS).  200 
𝑃𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒 = 1/(1 + e
−𝜆(𝑉𝐺−𝑉𝑆)) 201 
The softmax parameter, λ, defined the likeliness of choosing the better prospect; each option’s 202 
value (V) was defined according to prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), as the product 203 
of utility (u) and probability distortion (w) outputs: 204 
𝑉(𝑝, 𝑚) = 𝑤(𝑝) ∗ 𝑢(𝑚) 205 







where ρ>1 captured risk-seeking choice behavior, ρ<1 captured risk-averse choice behavior 208 
(ρ<1), and p=0 implied risk neutrality (Hsu, Krajbich, Zhao, & Camerer, 2009). Magnitude values 209 
were divided by 0.5 ml (mmax), such that the maximal reward a monkey could get was anchored 210 
at 1 unit of utility. 211 
We compared four functional models of probability distortion in an attempt to best capture 212 
changes in probability distortion across conditions. Of these classical models, two had a single 213 
fitting parameter: the one-parameter Prelec function (Eq. 6, Prelec-1, parameter: α) and the 214 
Kahneman and Tversky probability weighting function (Eq. 7, Tversky, parameter: ε); the others 215 
had two fitting parameters: the two-parameter Prelec function (Eq. 8, Prelec-2, parameters: α, β) 216 








𝑤(𝑝) =  e −(− ln(𝑝))
𝛼  218 
𝑤(𝑝) =  
𝑝𝜀
(𝑝𝜀 + (1 − 𝑝)𝜀)1/𝜀
 219 
𝑤(𝑝) =  e −𝛽(− ln(𝑝))
𝛼  220 
𝑤(𝑝) =
𝛿𝑝𝛾
𝛿𝑝𝛾 + (1 − p)𝛾
 221 
Using a maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) method we simultaneously estimated the functional 222 
parameters from the experimental data. We defined the log-likelihood function as: 223 
𝐿𝐿(𝑢(𝑚), 𝑤(𝑝)| 𝑦) =  ∑  𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1




∗ log(𝑃𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒 𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒) 224 
The log-likelihood function was defined on all trials in a session (n), the trial number (i) and the 225 
choice outcome parameter for the gambles and safe options (y and y’ respectively). The outcome 226 
parameters took a value of 1 if their respective option was chosen; 0 otherwise. We used an 227 
unconstrained Nelder-Mead search algorithm (MATLAB: fminsearch) to compute the functional 228 
parameters that minimized the negative log-likelihood (-LL). This maximum likelihood estimation 229 
approach allowed for the simultaneous estimation of the model’s free parameters, placing no 230 
constraints on their values (Abdellaoui, 2000; Pelé, Broihanne, Thierry, Call, & Dufour, 2014; W. 231 
R. Stauffer et al., 2015). 232 
The algorithm identified the best fitting softmax, utility, and probability distortion parameters with 233 
respect to each monkey’s daily choices on CE elicitation sequences. Four complete models were 234 
parametrized, accounting for the different probability distortion functions investigated. From these, 235 
we calculated the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to pinpoint the probability distortion 236 
function most reliable in capturing behavior. Four sets of parameters and their BIC were estimated 237 
for every testing day, independently for each model. We selected a single model for further 238 
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analysis, based on the flexibility of the functional model, its comparative BIC score (one-factor 239 
ANOVA with repeated measures, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p-values: pGGc), and the 240 
deviance between the model’s predicted CEs and the experimental ones (one-factor ANOVA with 241 
repeated measures, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p-values). 242 
We further validated the parameter estimation procedure by running 10 simulated choice datasets 243 
within the fitting algorithm. Datasets used for testing were generated by fixing the utility parameter 244 
(ρ) and varying the probability distortion parameter (α), or vice-versa. The softmax temperature 245 
parameter was kept constant (λ=10) as we specifically wanted to test the robustness of the 246 
estimation procedure in relation to variability in the utility and probability parameters. These fixed 247 
models were used to simulate individual trial choices. We simulated 6 trials for every gamble-safe 248 
pair (safe magnitude levels: 0 ml to 0.5 ml in steps of 0.05 ml). Five datasets varied in terms of 249 
utility (ρ = 0.20, 0.50, 1.00, 1.50, 3.00), five in terms of probability distortion (α = 0.33, 0.67, 1.00, 250 
1.50, 3.00). We measured estimation accuracy as the 95% confidence interval on estimated 251 
parameters from Monte Carlo simulations on the parameter-derived datasets.  252 
The final estimated parameters were first log-transformed to account for the asymmetric 253 
distribution of the utility and probability distortion parameters (ranging from 0 to ∞, with a value of 254 
1 defining the linear case). We then compared the parameter estimates via one-way MANOVA 255 
analysis with elicitation condition as main factor. From this multivariate analysis, we identified any 256 
significant effect of individual decision functions, while recognizing the collective role all three 257 
parameters in capturing risk preference. More specifically, the MANOVA identified which model 258 
function parameters (choice softmax, utility, or probability distortion) differed significantly between 259 
CE elicitation conditions. 260 
In the REPEATED condition, the gamble option did not change for long sequences of trials and 261 




safe option in this condition, we defined a model with different weights applied to the two options' 263 
values: 264 
𝑃𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒 = 1/(1 + e
−𝜆( (1−𝑘)∗𝑉𝐺 − 𝑘∗𝑉𝑆 )) 265 
The weight parameter (k) captured the attentional shift towards one option, if significantly larger 266 
than 0.5. The options’ values (VG, VS) were computed, as in the previous model, using the power 267 
utility function and the selected probability distortion function (Prelec-1). 268 
Evaluation of probability distortion in the Marschak-Machina triangle 269 
We introduced the Marschak-Machina triangle (Machina, 1982; Marschak, 1950) to compare the 270 
choice behavior between the MIXED and REPEATED conditions in an out-of-sample test, and to 271 
evaluate the theoretical predictions of the discrete choice model vis-à-vis utility and probability 272 
distortions. 273 
The Marschak-Machina triangle defines a two-dimensional space where any probabilistic 274 
combination of three fixed reward magnitudes m1<m2<m3 can be represented (see Results for 275 
details). The x- and y-axes correspond to the probability of obtaining the lowest (p1) reward m1 276 
and the highest (p3) reward m3, respectively. The probability of the middle magnitude is not 277 
explicitly represented in the diagram, but it can be readily obtained as p2=1-(p1+p3). Points on the 278 
horizontal axis therefore correspond to gambles with outcomes m1 and m2, while points on the 279 
vertical axis identify gambles with m2 and m3 as possible outcomes; the hypotenuse comprises 280 
all gambles containing outcomes m1 and m3 only. In our experiment we set the fixed magnitude 281 
levels to m1 = 0 ml, m2 = 0.25 ml and m3 = 0.5 ml. 282 
We characterized monkey A’s behavior within the Marschak-Machina triangle, by defining 283 
indifference lines between points on the triangle edges as follows: we presented choices between 284 
a fixed gamble (A), defined on one of the axes, and a set of gambles (Bi) located on the triangle’s 285 




indifference point on the hypotenuse as the probability p3 corresponding to a choice ratio of 0.5. 287 
We then defined an indifference line as the segment connecting the fixed gamble on the axis with 288 
its corresponding indifference point. This procedure was repeated for four fixed gambles on the 289 
x-axis (p1 = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8) and for another four fixed gambles on the y-axis (p3 = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 290 
0.8), resulting in 8 indifference lines. 291 
Note that such indifference lines characterized points on the triangle edges (two-outcome 292 
gambles): they did not represent complete indifference curves within the Marschak-Machina 293 
triangle (three-outcome gambles). Nevertheless, the slopes of the indifference lines univocally 294 
identified a directional property a monkey’s risk preference pattern: a gradual change in the slope 295 
(fanning-in or fanning-out) of indifference lines has been extensively used in the economic 296 
literature to characterize choice behavior, particularly in relation to the predictions of generalized 297 
expected utility theories. This property allowed us to quantify behavioral changes across elicitation 298 
conditions and to compare the observed data with predictions from the theoretical economic 299 
model.  300 
Crucially, gambles resting on the two axes were never used in the elicitation of CEs. representing 301 
an out-of-sample test. As a consequence, the choice behavior observed in the Marschak-Machina 302 
triangle could be used as independent validation for our previous results. 303 
We computed the theoretical indifference lines by calculating, for each of the eight fixed gambles 304 
defined above, the probability p3 for which the theoretical subjective value of the fixed gamble 305 
was equal to that of the gamble on the hypotenuse. The subjective value of a two-outcome gamble 306 
was defined according to cumulative prospect theory as 307 




where mH and mL represent the magnitude of the highest and lowest outcome respectively, pH the 309 
probability of occurrence of the highest outcome, u the power utility function and w the Prelec-1 310 
probability distortion function. 311 
The indifference point was defined as the point on the hypotenuse with subjective value equal to 312 
the subjective value of the fixed gamble. Thus, knowing the value of the fixed gamble, one could 313 
identify the indifference point as the probability p3 satisfying the equation u(m3)·w(p3) = V(gamble): 314 





where w-1 represents the inverse of the probability distortion function, i.e. w-1 = exp(-(-ln(w))1/α). 316 
Each daily set of indifference points was elicited after CE elicitation sequences, for both the 317 
MIXED and REPEATED CE elicitation sessions. This resulted in two sets of indifference lines, 318 
distinctly associated with the REPEATED and MIXED conditions. Both datasets were obtained 319 
using intermingled gamble sequences, so any difference in the pattern of indifference lines could 320 
only be attributed to the effect of the previous block of trials, i.e. REPEATED or MIXED CE 321 
elicitation. 322 
The directional pattern of the indifference lines was characterized by a measure of the “fanning” 323 
direction, corresponding to a gradual change in the slopes of indifference lines. When moving 324 
from the lower right to the top left corner of the Marschak-Machina triangle, indifference lines 325 
decreasing their slope would fan-in, while indifference lines increasing their slope would fan-out- 326 
much like the structural slats of a folding fan. 327 
A linear regression analysis on the indifference line slopes was used to statistically characterize 328 
the fanning pattern. A positive regression coefficient identified fanning-out of the indifference lines, 329 
while a negative regression coefficient identified fanning-in. It should be noted that the relation 330 




but the linear regression served as a reasonable description of the expected theoretical pattern 332 
and was then used to characterize the measured behavior. 333 
In order to statistically compare the predicted and observed sequence effects on the steepness 334 
of the indifference lines, we first calculated the shift of indifference points (change in p3 value) 335 
between the REPEATED and MIXED conditions; we did this for each of the eight indifference 336 
lines, for both the measured data and the model’s predicted lines. We then carried out a 337 
correlation analysis on the modeled and measured shifts. 338 
Trial History Effects 339 
Since gamble presentation order was the only difference between the MIXED and REPEATED 340 
elicitation sequences, we sought to categorize the effects of said order on the subjective distortion 341 
of probabilities. Using past gamble EVs as a quantitative measure of past experiences – specific 342 
to probabilities – we compared the distribution and use of previous gamble EVs across elicitation 343 
condition. 344 
We first compared the variability of consecutive gamble probabilities in both conditions using a 345 
two-sample t-test. We used the absolute value of consecutive gamble EV differences to contrast 346 
order in an unsigned matter, as signed differences would amount to zero in both cases. We then 347 
assessed the use of past gamble EVs using the following logistic regression: 348 
𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐸𝑉𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒) + 𝛽2(𝐸𝑉𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒) + 𝛽3(𝐸𝑉𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒−1) + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑛(𝐸𝑉𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒−𝑛) +  349 
Again, the dependent variable took a value of y = 1 if the gamble was chosen and y = 0 if the safe 350 
option was chosen instead. The EV of both the current gamble and safe (EVgamble, EVsafe), as well 351 
as the gamble EV of up to 8 trials in the past (EVgamble-n) served as independent variables. Trials 352 
that did not have a minimum of 8 previous trials, in individual sessions, were removed for this 353 
analysis. We again standardized regression coefficients, and identified how many past gamble 354 




to a singular preceding trial – we investigated the use of a win-stay/lose-shift (WSLS) strategy by 356 
the animals. A common strategy for human and non-human primates alike, a WSLS choice 357 
pattern involves repeating a ‘winning’ choice until it results in a ‘loss’, one would then shift and try 358 
their luck on another choice option. Since choice options in the CE elicitation sequences involved 359 
many different values for both the gamble and the safe options, we instead explored a more 360 
relaxed WSLS model: 361 
𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐸𝑉𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒) + 𝛽2(𝐸𝑉𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒) + 𝛽3( 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐿𝑅) +  362 
If the previous choice had been that of a gamble, and that gamble had won (i.e. resulted in a 0.5 363 
ml reward), the 3rd independent variable (Outcomepast) took a value of 1; if the past chosen gamble 364 
had instead been unsuccessful, Outcomepast was 0. By including current EVGamble, EVSafe, and 365 
PositionLR, we could identify the relative effect of a previous gamble’s outcome on current choice. 366 
The logistic regression analysis was only applied to trials in which the previous trial's gamble was 367 
chosen. A positive regression coefficient for Outcomepast implied a greater likelihood of picking 368 
the gamble after a ‘win’, regardless of its value. A negative coefficient would, instead, capture a 369 
decrease in the likelihood of picking the gamble, whatever it may be, after a ‘loss’. 370 
In order to compare the performance of this model with the previously defined model (Eq. 2), 371 
which did not include the contribution of past trials, we computed the BIC scores of the two models 372 
only in trials in which the previous gamble was chosen. After this trial selection, we removed 5 373 
sessions in Monkey A’s data, as they had fewer than 4 trials per gamble-safe pair. 374 
To further investigate the effect of past outcomes on the risk patterns, we defined a reinforcement 375 
learning model, in which each gamble value was updated, starting from its EV, by adding or 376 
removing a fixed amount following a win or a loss respectively. Formally, choices were evaluated 377 




the certain option’s magnitude (linear coding of magnitudes), while the gamble value (VG) was 379 
updated on each trial according to the rule: 380 
𝑉𝐺 = 𝑉𝐺 + 𝜂 ∙  𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑖𝑛 −  𝜂 ∙  𝑝𝑟𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 381 
Where preWin and preLoss are variables encoding the last trial’s outcome, i.e. preWin=1 if a gamble 382 
was won in the previous trial, 0 otherwise, and vice versa for preLoss. The value-updating 383 
parameter η represents the amount of value (in ml) added or removed to the gamble value based 384 
on the previous outcome. According to this model, the gamble value was not updated if the safe 385 
option had been chosen on the previous trial. 386 
We retrieved the η parameter value using MLE, and used the resulting average value to simulate 387 
choices and compute the resulting CEs. The simulation was run on MIXED and REPEATED 388 
sequences separately, in order to compare the effect of a value-updating model on the CEs in the 389 
two sequence conditions. 390 
Statistical Analysis 391 
We used MATLAB and/or Python for all statistical analyses. Logistic regressions were computed 392 
per session and results were standardized by multiplying each coefficient with the ratio of the 393 
corresponding independent variable's standard deviation over the standard deviation of the 394 
predicted variable (Menard, 2011). Standardized regression coefficients were tested for statistical 395 
significance through one sample t-test. Two-factor ANOVA, one-factor MANOVA, linear 396 
regression, and t-test results were considered significant at p<0.05, while one-way repeated-397 
measures ANOVAs were Greenhouse-Geisser corrected (degrees of freedom adjustment) to 398 
account for sphericity violations (Mauchly’s test p<0.05; Greenhouse & Geisser, 1959). Post-hoc 399 
analysis with Bonferroni-Holm correction for multiple comparisons were applied to ANOVA 400 
results. Cohen’s d values were used as a measure of effect sizes. In all analyses of data from 401 






We tested whether the shape of the probability distortion would be influenced by the order in 406 
which probability information is presented in a sequence of decisions. 407 
Once the animals had been extensively trained with the reward-predicting stimuli (>10,000 trials), 408 
we presented them with sequences of binary choices between different probabilistic rewards (or 409 
gambles) and safe rewards (Fig. 1).  We then used the choice ratios to measure the value of 410 
gambles relative to certain rewards - pinpointing the certain rewards that were subjectively 411 
equivalent to gambles, or a gamble’s certainty equivalent (CE). This procedure revealed the 412 
animals’ attitude towards risky choices: gamble CEs larger than said gamble’s objective expected 413 
value (EV) reflected risk-seeking behavior; risk-aversion was characterized instead by gamble 414 
CEs smaller than the gamble’s EV. 415 
By simultaneously estimating the individual contributions of utility and probability distortion to 416 
these measures of risk attitudes, we could model the shape of the monkeys’ probability distortion 417 
irrespective of the utility function. 418 
Basic behavioral performance 419 
A logistic regression analysis demonstrated that the monkeys used the information from the visual 420 
stimuli to guide their decisions on all daily testing sessions (Fig. 2a). A positive regression 421 
coefficient for gamble value (one-sample t-test, Monkey A: t(55)=29.41, p=2.5×10-35; Monkey B: 422 
t(58)=30.16, p=3.9×10-37) indicated that animals were more likely to choose higher probability 423 
gambles than lower probability ones; conversely, the negative coefficient for safe reward value 424 
(Monkey A: t(55)=-44.65, p=6.8×10-45; Monkey B: t(58)=-58.61, p=2.6×10-53) indicated that 425 
monkeys chose the safe option more frequently when its value was of higher magnitude. Both 426 
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animals preferred gambles of higher over lower probabilistic variance, i.e. they preferred gambles 427 
that were more uncertain, regardless of the outcome (positive coefficient for risk; Monkey A: 428 
t(55)=4.58, p=2.7×10-5; Monkey B: t(58)=7.79, p=1.4×10-10). Monkey A, but not monkey B, 429 
showed a side bias (positive coefficient for the position variable), which was taken into account 430 
by balancing the positions of gambles and safe rewards: every option was presented the same 431 
number of times on each side of the computer monitor. 432 
Estimation of subjective values using different sequence structures 433 
We used a binary choice paradigm to estimate the monkeys’ subjective valuation of specific 434 
gambles. We measured the choice ratios between different safe rewards and gambles ranging in 435 
probabilities from p=0.1 to p=0.9. Fitting a softmax curve to each of these gamble-safe groups 436 
allowed us to estimate the CEs corresponding to different gamble probabilities (see Materials and 437 
methods). These CEs served as a measure of subjective value for unique probabilities and 438 
provided us with a precise measure of an animal’s risk preference over the range of probabilities 439 
tested. 440 
We elicited CEs in both monkeys using two different elicitation conditions: MIXED and 441 
REPEATED gamble sequences (Fig. 2b). In the MIXED condition, we estimated CEs from 442 
sequences of binary choices containing several different gambles pitted against safe rewards. All 443 
gamble and safe options presented were randomly intermixed, and multiple CEs were estimated 444 
from these sequences – one for each gamble. In the REPEATED condition, we elicited CEs from 445 
blocks of trials that contained a single, unique gamble versus different safe rewards. In this way, 446 
we elicited a unique gamble’s CE for each given block. Importantly, the two conditions used the 447 
same visual stimuli; any difference between estimated CEs would therefore be due to the 448 
elicitation sequence in which CEs were estimated. 449 
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We aggregated the daily CEs of individual monkeys, for both conditions, to determine the risk-450 
preference pattern derived from the CEs measured in each elicitation sequence. The risk-451 
preference pattern was therefore directly inferred from the relation between the CEs and the 452 
respective EVs, as opposed to being theoretically derived from the shape of utility and probability 453 
distortion functions. We found a significant difference between the distribution of CE values 454 
elicited in REPEATED versus those elicited in MIXED sequences (two-way ANOVA, factors: 455 
gamble probability, elicitation condition). As expected, we found a significant main effect of reward 456 
probability on a gamble’s CE: higher probability gambles had a higher certainty equivalent in both 457 
animals (Monkey A: F(8,237)=444.12, p=5.2×10-138; Monkey B: F(8,337)=241.14, p=1.4×10-134). 458 
We also saw a main effect of elicitation conditions (Monkey A: F(1,237)=7.69, p=0.006; Monkey 459 
B: F(1,337)=20.21, p=9.6×10-6), where CEs elicited in the MIXED condition were significantly 460 
different to those in the REPEATED condition. Adding to this effect, we observed a significant 461 
interaction effect between probability and condition (Monkey A: F(8,237)=7.73, p=3.3×10-9; 462 
Monkey B: F(8,337)=12.56, p=8.5×10-16), suggesting that the different elicitation sequences had 463 
a more complex effect on CE values than a mere monotonic increase or decrease. This effect 464 
was readily observable from the condition-specific CE distributions (Fig. 2c), where the concave 465 
pattern of the MIXED-condition CEs contrasts with the S-shaped distribution of the REPEATED-466 
condition CEs. 467 
Sequence-dependent changes in probability distortion 468 
Since CE elicitation rested on reward options that varied in both magnitude and probability, any 469 
risk-preference changes could be attributed to non-linear utility, probability distortion, or a 470 
combination of both. To better understand the role of these decision variables in shaping a 471 
gamble’s subjective value, we simultaneously estimated the shape of both functions from the 472 
monkeys’ daily binary choices. Using a standard discrete choice model (Eq. 3), we elicited 473 
functional parameters that best explained each animal’s choices between gamble-safe choice 474 
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pairs on individual days, assuming non-linear utility and probability distortion. The estimation 475 
procedure allowed parameters to take on any value, imposing no constraints beyond the 476 
functional forms of the discrete choice softmax, probability distortion, and utility curves.  477 
We defined the value of each reward option as the product of its subjective probability and utility, 478 
consistent with prospect theory and other modern decision theories (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 479 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). As is traditionally done, we modeled utility through a one-parameter 480 
power function. The simple power function accounted well for risk-seeking (ρ>1), risk-aversive 481 
(ρ<1), or risk neutral attitude (ρ=1) for the range of reward magnitudes. We tested only one model 482 
for utility, as magnitude presentations did not differ across conditions. Instead, we sought to 483 
optimize our choice model with regards to subjective probability, since CE elicitation sequences 484 
differed in terms of the order in which gamble probabilities were experienced. We tested four 485 
classical models of probability distortion to maximize the reliability of our model in capturing real 486 
choices; two of these functions had one free parameter, the others had two. Finally, we defined 487 
cumulative log-likelihood functions for each of these models and estimated the best-fitting 488 
parameters for each decision function through maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) (see 489 
Materials and methods).  490 
Across all testing sessions, the BIC scores of the Prelec curves were consistently lower than the 491 
one-parameter Tversky and lower than the Gonzalez models in at least monkeys (Fig. 3a). 492 
However, while the two-parameter Prelec had a marginally lower BIC score in both animals, the 493 
one-parameter Prelec showed had a marginally lower sum of squared errors (SSE) between 494 
predicted and average experimental CEs (one-factor ANOVA with repeated measures, Monkey 495 
A: F(3,144)=6.166, pGGc=5.7×104; Monkey B: F(3,168)=3.699, pGGc=1.3×10-2).  We ultimately 496 
selected the one-parameter Prelec due to this lower SSE, lower parameter count, and because 497 
of its ease of interpretation: for the curvature parameter α>1 the function underweighted low 498 
probabilities and overweighted high ones, for α<1, low probabilities were overweighted and high 499 
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ones were underweighted. With an α=1, probabilities were treated linearly. Monte Carlo 500 
simulations from predefined parameters confirmed the reliability of the MLE method for the 501 
selected model: we recovered accurate parameters for both the utility (Fig. 3b) and probability 502 
distortion (Fig. 3c) functions. 503 
Having selected the one-parameter Prelec as the best-fitting probability distortion function, we 504 
estimated the functional parameters of our choice model (Eq. 3) using the MLE method. The 505 
model was able to capture the characteristic pattern of risk attitudes observed in our experimental 506 
data: CEs of low probability gambles resulted larger than the respective EVs in the MIXED 507 
condition, while CEs of high probability gambles were larger than their EVs in the REPEATED 508 
condition (Fig. 3d), in accordance with the measured behavior (Fig. 2b). 509 
We compared daily estimated parameters across CE elicitation conditions for utility and 510 
probability distortion (Fig. 4a). Both animals exhibited convex utility (ρ>1) in the tested range of 511 
0-0.5 ml accounting for risk-seeking behavior, with linearity only in the case of Monkey B’s 512 
REPEATED condition. Importantly, probability distortions inverted across elicitation condition. In 513 
the MIXED elicitation condition, both animals overweighted low probabilities and underweighted 514 
high ones (α>1), while they instead underweighted low probabilities and overweighted high ones 515 
within the REPEATED condition (α<1) (Fig. 4b). MANOVA analysis confirmed the impact of the 516 
different elicitation sequences on both animals’ choice pattern (Monkey A: F(1,54)=24.96, Wilks’s 517 
λ=0.41, p=3.85×10-10, η2=0.59; Monkey B: F(1,57)=40.78, Wilk’s λ=0.31, p=5.2×10-14, η2=0.69) 518 
with only the probability distortion parameter (α) consistently different across conditions (Fig. 519 
4a,c). The change in risk-attitude between the two conditions could therefore, at least in the case 520 
of gamble-safe choices, be reduced to a reversal in the probability distortion function. 521 
The REPEATED condition was a much less complex decision situation compared to the MIXED 522 
one, theoretically allowing for a simpler choice strategy: it would have been sufficient to evaluate 523 
the certain option, ignoring the gamble option in the majority of trials, to make choices. 524 
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We tested for this possibility by fitting a model with an attentional parameter to the choice data 525 
(Eq. 11). We found that there was no significant difference in attention given to the safe compared 526 
to the gamble option (the weight parameter was not significantly different from 0.5; Monkey A: 527 
t(21)=-2.01, p=5.7×10-2 (t-test), Monkey B: t(30)=-1.25; p=2.2×10-1), suggesting that both options 528 
were fully considered when making choices in the REPEATED condition. 529 
Reversal of probability distortion in the Marschak-Machina triangle 530 
To extend our findings past gamble-safe choices, we characterized the choice behavior of one 531 
monkey in a different set of gambles using the Marschak-Machina triangle. This diagram was first 532 
introduced as a way of “organizing” a series of anomalies observed in risky choices, most notably 533 
the common ratio and common consequence effects, which violated the independence axiom of 534 
EU theory. Several economic theories were developed to explain these apparent paradoxes. 535 
Each theory predicted indifference curves with distinctive shapes in the Marschak-Machina 536 
triangle, making it an ideal framework to evaluate and compare the alternative theories (Machina, 537 
1982). 538 
The use of this diagram, which makes it possible to represent a more general class of choice 539 
options, i.e. gambles with three fixed outcomes of varying probabilities (Fig. 5a), allowed us to 540 
extend our results to a wider range of problems. We did this to test the robustness of the 541 
parametric modeling (out-of-sample test) and, most importantly, to investigate the effect of 542 
elicitation condition from a different perspective: by looking at the change in direction of 543 
indifference lines, which connected points of the triangle edges for which the animal expressed 544 
choice indifference (Fig. 5b), we could quantify the effects of elicitation condition that were 545 
specifically dependent on changes in probability distortion, and independent of changes in the 546 
shape of the utility function. 547 
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One of the theoretical consequences of probability distortions in the Marschak-Machina triangle 548 
is that indifference lines would not be parallel to each other, as in the case of linear probability 549 
weighting, but would instead fan-out or fan-in depending on the probability distortion (Fig. 5c): an 550 
inverse S-shaped probability distortion would induce fanning-out, while an S-shaped one would 551 
result in indifference lines fanning-in. Fanning-out would in fact correspond to an increase in the 552 
steepness of the indifference lines when shifting “probability mass” from worse to better 553 
outcomes. As steeper lines correlate with more risk-seeking behavior, fanning-out would imply an 554 
inverse S-shaped probability distortion. The opposite would happen with fanning-in indifference 555 
lines, then corresponding to an S-shaped probability distortion function (Camerer, 1989). 556 
Crucially, because the outcome magnitudes used in the Marschak-Machina triangle are fixed, the 557 
fanning direction is independent of the utility function and is therefore solely determined by the 558 
shape of the probability distortion. In that sense, any observed change in the fanning direction of 559 
the indifference lines with a change in elicitation sequence could only be due to a change in the 560 
probability weighting function (Fig. 5c). 561 
We used the previously recovered parameters for utility and probability distortion to estimate the 562 
expected pattern of indifference lines in the two experimental conditions, MIXED and REPEATED 563 
sequences. We then compared the predicted directions of the indifference lines with the 564 
measured ones. As expected, the theoretical indifference lines, modeled using the previously 565 
elicited parameters, showed a slight fanning-out pattern for the MIXED condition, where a weakly 566 
inverse S-shaped probability distortion was measured. Conversely, we saw a fanning-in pattern 567 
in the REPEATED condition, for which we had observed an S-shaped probability distortion (Fig. 568 
6a, left). 569 
The direct experimental measure of indifference lines was carried out by presenting the animals 570 
with binary choices between a gamble represented by a fixed point on the triangle edge and one 571 
of several points on the triangle’s hypotenuse. The indifference line was defined as the segment 572 
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connecting the fixed point with the point corresponding to choice indifference on the hypotenuse. 573 
This procedure resulted in a directional pattern of indifference lines compatible with the 574 
theoretically predicted one, with no clear fanning direction of indifference lines in the MIXED 575 
condition, and clear fanning-in in the REPEATED condition (Fig. 6a, right). We quantified this 576 
directional pattern of indifference lines using a measure for the fanning direction. The fanning of 577 
indifference lines corresponds to a gradual change in the slope of indifference lines: when moving 578 
from the lower right corner of the probability triangle to the upper left corner, an increasing slope 579 
would produce fanning-out, whereas a decreasing slope would produce fanning-in. Following this 580 
principle, we statistically assessed the fanning direction of the indifference lines by computing a 581 
linear regression on the slopes of the indifference lines. Results show no significant regression 582 
slope in the MIXED condition (R2=0.08, p=0.50), indicating no fanning of indifference curves, while 583 
in the REPEATED condition a significant linear regression (R2=0.98, p=4.4×10-6) indicated 584 
fanning-out of the indifference lines. These results are consistent with predictions from the 585 
modeled indifference lines, which show a similar pattern of fanning directions (Fig. 6b). 586 
We statistically compared the measured and predicted patterns of indifference lines by calculating 587 
the shift in the location of indifference points across conditions; the latter corresponding to 588 
changes in the slope of indifference lines. A significant correlation between the predicted and 589 
measured shifts (Pearson's correlation coefficient r=0.78, p=4.0×10-3) confirmed that the 590 
experimental data complied with our theoretical predictions (Fig. 6c), and supported the finding 591 
that probability distortion drove the change in risk attitude between REPEATED and MIXED 592 
conditions. 593 
The Effect of Trials History on the Probability Distortion 594 
Because CE the structure of elicitation sequences appeared to affect probability distortions 595 
specifically, we investigated whether the differences in choice behavior could be explained in 596 
relation to past experiences, or trial history. One key difference between elicitation sequences 597 
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was the order of the probabilities presented on the screen. In the MIXED sequences, the monkeys 598 
were much more likely to have experienced different gambles in their immediate past than in trials 599 
from REPEATED sequences, where the same gamble was repeated numerous times. 600 
Consequently, while the range of probabilities, magnitudes, and safe outcomes was identical in 601 
both conditions, the variability of past gambles was significantly different between the two 602 
conditions (Fig. 1d,e). 603 
Since humans and non-human primates, much like rodents, often base part of their risky decisions 604 
on recent experiences (Barron & Erev, 2003; Hayden, B; Heilbronner, S; Nair, A; Platt, 2013; 605 
Marshall & Kirkpatrick, 2013; Nowak & Sigmund, 1993), we again ran a logistic regression on the 606 
probability of choosing the gamble option: this time to verify if the EV of past gambles had any 607 
impact on the animals’ decisions (Eq. 14). We found that, in the MIXED condition, both monkeys 608 
made use of at least one past gamble to make their decision (Fig. 7a). The monkeys appeared to 609 
bias their choices in favor of the gamble (positive regression coefficient) when the prior gamble’s  610 
EV was higher. In game-theoric terms, and taking the gamble’s EV as a proxy for its ‘win rate’, 611 
monkeys seemed to follow a win-stay/lose-shift (WSLS) strategy, whereby receiving a reward 612 
from a risky choice option increased the likelihood of choosing a similar option again; the opposite 613 
true for choices where the risky option resulted in a loss (no reward). To validate this hypothesis, 614 
we applied a WSLS-compatible model (Eq. 15) on the immediate trial history of both monkeys, 615 
looking at their propensity to choose a gamble over a safe outcome when they had previously 616 
chosen a gamble and won (Fig. 7b). As expected, we found a significant effect of both the current 617 
gamble’s EV (one-sample t-test, Monkey A: t(50)=29.41, p=3.19×10-33; Monkey B: t(58)=32.28, 618 
p=9.38×10-39) and the current safe outcome’s EV on the likelihood of choosing a gamble (one-619 
sample t-test, Monkey A: t(50)=-38.71, p=6.05×10-39; Monkey B: t(58)=-46.19, p=1.9×10-47). Both 620 
monkeys had a small but significant side bias (one-sample t-test, Monkey A: t(50)=-4.59, 621 
p=2.97×10-5; Monkey B: t(58)=-2.55, p=1.3×10-2). More importantly, there was a significant 622 
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positive effect of ‘winning’ the preceding gamble on the likelihood of selecting the gamble option 623 
again, regardless of value (one-sample t-test, Monkey A: t(50)=10.75, p=1.3×10-14; Monkey B: 624 
t(58)=8.32, p=1.76×10-11). In other words, receiving a reward from a risky gamble made the next 625 
gamble more attractive relative to the safe outcome. 626 
We investigated this effect further, by estimating separate utility and probability distortion 627 
parameters in trials where a past gamble had been selected and ‘won’, and in trials where the 628 
past selected gamble had been ‘lost’. Due to lower trial counts per session after this trial selection, 629 
all sessions were pooled for each condition. In both animals, the utility function estimated from 630 
the former class of trials was more convex than the utility estimated from unrewarded trials (Fig. 631 
7c). Probability distortions, however, were not consistently different between these two classes of 632 
trials, maintaining their respective inverse-S and S-shapes for MIXED and REPEATED 633 
conditions. Much like in the logistic regression, these results suggested a tendency to choose the 634 
gamble option more often after rewarded (win) trials, compared to unrewarded trials (a more 635 
convex utility function corresponding to stronger risk-seeking behavior). What it also highlighted, 636 
however, was a change in the relative value distribution between gambles and safe options - one 637 
that varies with past experience. In other words, gambles following a rewarded trial would be of 638 
higher relative value for the monkeys than those following unrewarded trials, at least in terms of 639 
safe rewards. 640 
Past win or lost effects on subjective value could account for some of the gap in probability 641 
distortion observed across our two conditions. A MIXED sequence of gambles would drive 642 
subjective value estimates in an opposing pattern to that of a REPEATED elicitation sequence 643 
simply due to task structure. In the case of MIXED sequences, the random distribution of gamble 644 
probabilities would indeed result in an inverse-S probability distortion. Gambles with probabilities 645 
larger than 0.5 would, more often than not, follow a gamble of lower EV; the monkey would then, 646 
on average, be less likely to pick said gamble due to the decrease in subjective value estimate 647 
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following lower past returns. This would drive down the CE value of high probability gambles. In 648 
the case of low probability gambles, high past returns would drive CEs up. From this, we would 649 
expect an opposing distortion pattern in a REPEATED condition. For any gamble, the CE value 650 
would be distorted in a way proportional to its own probability: a low probability gamble would be 651 
driven down in value by repeated experience, whereas a high probability gamble would see its 652 
value go up.  A change in gamble value, rather than a simple WSLS strategy, might also have 653 
longer lasting effects and could explain the persistence of sequence type effects when looking at 654 
choices in the Marschak-Machina triangle paradigm.  655 
To test this hypothesis directly, we developed a simple reinforcement learning model in which 656 
gamble values were updated based on the previous trial’s outcome: the value of a gamble 657 
increased by a fixed amount after a win, and decreased by the same amount after a loss (Eq. 16). 658 
Importantly, in the choice model, the gambles’ starting values were the respective objective EVs, 659 
which were compared to the objective safe magnitudes in order to make choices. No utility or 660 
probability distortion were included, only the previous choice softmax function, and we made no 661 
distinction between parameters estimated in repeated or mixed sequences. We again estimated 662 
the model parameters through MLE on each session’s trial-by-trial choice data, and retrieved a 663 
significant, mean value-updating parameter for both monkeys (Monkey A: η = 4.5×10-3 ± 9.0×10-664 
4 SEM; t(55)=4.96, p=7.1×10-6; Monkey B: η = 4.1×10-3 ± 5.8×10-4 SEM; t(58)=7.1, p=2.0×10-9). 665 
The value of η corresponded to the fixed amount of value being added to or removed from the 666 
gamble’s subjective value estimate following “win” and “lose” trials respectively. 667 
After running the estimation procedure on all sessions, we tested if the average observed value-668 
updating parameter could explain the different CE distributions seen across the MIXED and 669 
REPEATED conditions. We computed CEs from simulated choices using the learning model 670 
defined above (Eq. 16), using the mean softmax and value-updating parameters, still holding 671 
utility and probability weights linear. The resulting pattern of simulated CEs (Fig. 7d) followed the 672 
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experimental pattern. In particular, it captured the clear separation between the two CE elicitation 673 
sequences. Although this model appeared to have a lower BIC score than the “classical” prospect 674 
theory model (Eq. 3) (Monkey A: BICEq16=160.7, BICEq3=137.5, t(55)=6.92, p=5.01×10-9; Monkey 675 
B: BICEq16=419.8, BICEq3=392.7, t(58)=4.69, p=1.70×10-5), it accounted for the change in the 676 
pattern of CEs across both conditions using a single set of parameters. Conversely, two different 677 
sets of parameters were necessary for the prospect theory counterpart to capture the different 678 
CE patterns. 679 
Taken together, these results suggest that a simple value updating mechanism that modifies 680 
gamble values based on the previous outcomes, applied to different elicitation sequences, would 681 




This study demonstrated that the shape of the probability weighting function guiding value-based 686 
choices in monkeys depended largely on the task’s sequence structure. When deriving CEs from 687 
sequences in which different probabilistic rewards pseudorandomly alternated (MIXED), we found 688 
that monkeys overweighted low probability rewards and underweighted high probability ones. 689 
Conversely, the same CE elicitation method yielded the opposite choice pattern (underweighting 690 
of low probabilities and overweighting of high ones) when choice sequences consisted of trial 691 
blocks each containing a unique, REPEATED gamble. By simultaneously eliciting utility and 692 
probability weighting functions from each of these elicitation conditions, we showed that the two 693 
opposing choice patterns we observed could be explained by a reversal of the standard inverse 694 
S-shaped probability distortion function, seen when gambles were MIXED, to an S-shaped 695 
distortion when identical gambles were REPEATED. We confirmed and extended these results 696 
by comparing choice indifference lines in the Marschak-Machina triangle representations of the 697 
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two elicitation conditions. The triangle’s indifference maps were compatible with the observed 698 
inversion of probability distortions, preserving the weighting patterns in trials where no safe 699 
options were presented. Finally, by analyzing both sequence structure and monkeys' choices in 700 
relation to previous trials, we showed that a past-driven update of subjective values could partially 701 
explain the observed reversal in probability distortion. 702 
Modern economic theories of choice under risk introduced distorted probability weightings to 703 
account for biases and departures from expected utility theory’s predictions (Allais, 1953; 704 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944).  Since then, the typical finding 705 
has been that humans overweighted low probabilities all the while underweighting high ones 706 
(Abdellaoui, 2000; Gonzalez & Wu, 1999; Lattimore, Baker, & Witte, 1992; Tobler, Christopoulos, 707 
O’Doherty, Dolan, & Schultz, 2008), an inverse-S probability distortion (Kahneman & Tversky, 708 
1979). This shape has also been replicated in monkeys (W. R. Stauffer et al., 2015), where 709 
human-ported tasks resulted in a reliable inverse-S probability distortion. The current study ties-710 
in with these findings, using a coherent set of visual stimuli for both gambles and safe reward 711 
options to control for any bias introduced by the different visual representations of the two option 712 
types. Our results, in addition to reliability capturing macaque behavior using modern economic 713 
choice theories, further characterize the effects of sequence structure on utility and probability 714 
distortion. 715 
In contrast to the generally reported inverse-S shaped probability distortion, a growing number of 716 
studies on human and animal subjects have highlighted the variability in probability distortion 717 
shapes, both across subjects and between task conditions (Bruhin et al., 2010; Farashahi et al., 718 
2018; Hey & Strazzera, 1989). Recent work by Farashahi et al. (2018), emphasized the flexibility 719 
of probability weights in adapting to contextual changes, after finding that S-shaped and linear 720 
probability distortions could be seen in monkeys when performing different tasks. Our 721 
experimental data confirmed this high level of behavioral flexibility in monkeys, whereby directly 722 
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manipulating the order of presented gambles in a single task produced opposing patterns of 723 
probability distortion.   724 
Other findings from human experiments suggest that the way in which probability information is 725 
presented could account for the reported variability in subjects’ risk attitudes. For example, when 726 
reward probabilities are explicitly described (choice from description) to human subjects, they act 727 
as if overweighting the probability of rare events, but when probabilities are learned from 728 
experience (choice from experience), subjects choose as if underweighting the probability of rare 729 
events. This effect has been aptly referred to as the description-experience (DE) gap (Hertwig et 730 
al., 2004), and appears to extend to other primates. Indeed, monkeys have been shown to be 731 
more risk-seeking for experienced than for described gambles, implying a DE gap effect in non-732 
human primates (Heilbronner & Hayden, 2016). While some authors have called for two separate 733 
theories explaining choices from description and choices from experience (Abdellaoui, L’Haridon, 734 
& Paraschiv, 2011; Hertwig & Erev, 2009), others have suggested that prospect theory could 735 
effectively describe choice in the two situations when allowing for a change in the probability 736 
distortion function between the two settings (Frey, Mata, & Hertwig, 2015; Ungemach, Chater, & 737 
Stewart, 2009). 738 
While the dichotomous choice patterns we observed are comparable to those described in the 739 
DE gap studies, here the cues representing reward probabilities were identical in the two 740 
sequence conditions. In both MIXED and REPEATED sequences, probabilities were described 741 
explicitly through cues, learned from experience by the animals; the conditions only differed in the 742 
presentation order of the probability information. While the task design was different from previous 743 
human DE studies in this respect, the repeated sampling of outcomes typically used to ‘learn’ the 744 
value of risky prospects in choices from experience (for review see Wulff, Mergenthaler-Canseco, 745 
& Hertwig, 2018) echoes the repetitive structure of our REPEATED sequence; conversely, 746 
described prospects are typically presented in a less structured, randomized sequence, 747 
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analogous to our MIXED condition. While a direct comparison remains to be done, findings in 748 
both the DE gap experiments and in the present study suggest that past trial outcomes play a role 749 
in shaping the subjective perception of reward probabilities. 750 
Sampling bias has been identified as a source of variability in probability distortions, particularly 751 
in relation to the DE gap. Indeed, sampling bias is particularly problematic in ‘experienced’ 752 
conditions due to the limited number of trials used in learning the options’ values: with small 753 
sample sizes, low probability gambles are often rewarded less frequently than would be 754 
prescribed by their nominal probability (Camilleri & Newell, 2013; Hertwig & Erev, 2009; Hertwig 755 
& Pleskac, 2010). The use of identical descriptive cues and elicitation procedures in the present 756 
study ensured that similar sampling sizes were applied, and indeed required, to estimate CEs for 757 
every gamble. Any bias would therefore affect the two conditions in a similar manner. With no 758 
obvious sampling biases, our data suggest that the DE gap could be modeled on the probability 759 
distortion changes we observed across task conditions, and that much like in the present study, 760 
the observed changes in risk-preferences - from described to experienced reward probabilities - 761 
might result from differences in the task’s presentation order of probability information.  762 
A final source of variability we considered was that the REPEATED condition was a much less 763 
complex decision situation than the MIXED one: one could ignore the gamble in long, repeated 764 
sequences. However, we found that the animals neither differentially weighed the options, nor 765 
made choices faster in the REPEATED condition, indicating that they were not using widely 766 
differing valuation strategies. 767 
The Marschak-Machina triangle, a diagram widely used in the economics literature, allows for the 768 
intuitive representation of choices between two- and three-outcome gambles, serving as an ideal 769 
framework for investigating complex economic choice problems (Camerer, 1989; Machina, 1987). 770 
In the current experiment we elicited indifference points in the Marschak-Machina triangle 771 
representation of the monkeys’ behavior, which crucially provided a link between animal and 772 
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human studies. Although full indifference curves within the Marschak-Machina triangle remain to 773 
be tested, we showed that indifference points on the triangle edges complied with economic 774 
theories of choice, and confirmed the reversal of probability distortion across conditions – this 775 
time with probabilistic rewards only. Consequently, we demonstrated the possibility of rigorous 776 
behavioral characterization in non-human primates, paving the way for future investigations into 777 
the neurophysiological basis of advanced economic constructs like probability distortion, specific 778 
economic axioms, or the neural counterparts of alternative economic theories. 779 
In conclusion, our results demonstrated the effect of a task’s sequence structure on the shape of 780 
a monkey’s elicited probability distortion, and highlighted the potential influence of past rewards 781 
on subjective value. Moreover, and perhaps most significantly, these adaptive effects extended 782 
through time: the patterns of indifference lines observed in the Marschak-Machina triangle after a 783 
session of MIXED or REPEATED sequences were compatible with the probability distortion 784 
shapes measured in the preceding CE elicitation session, even though the paradigm used in the 785 
Marschak-Machina triangle was always randomized. In this sense, the CE elicitation sequences 786 
preceding the Marschak-Machina triangle paradigm might have driven and reinforced a gap 787 
between the subjective values of identical probabilities, one that influenced choices between 788 
gambles in the Marschak-Machina triangle. The reinforcement learning model we used supports 789 
this hypothesis, implying that each experienced outcome could reinforce and update the 790 
subjective value of probabilities, leading to a flexible, and contextually driven judgement of 791 
probabilistic information. More sophisticated models, such as the addition of a standard Rescorla-792 
Wagner learning rule or a non-linear transformation of safe magnitudes to the current value 793 
updating mechanism, could be more biologically plausible and successful in explaining the choice 794 
mechanism – and so remain to be explored. It should be noted that the monkeys’ initial 795 
learning/association phase was not analyzed here in reinforcement learning terms, as it was 796 
carried out with imperative trials. A better understanding of probability learning, and the 797 
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permanence of subjective values reinforced across different conditions could shed light on the 798 
core elements of prospect theory, and on the undeniably-adaptive nature of utility and probability 799 
distortions. 800 
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Figure 1. Experimental design. a, Trial sequence. Each trial started with the monkey moving a white cursor, through 908 
left/right arm movements with a joystick, to the center of the screen. After 0.5 to 1 s (center holding), two cues appeared 909 
indicating the two offered options (choice period): possible reward magnitudes and probabilities were indicated by the 910 
vertical position and width of a horizontal bar, respectively. A single horizontal bar indicated a sure reward, two bars 911 
indicated a gamble with two possible outcomes. The monkey moved the cursor to the side of the preferred option, 912 
within 2 s. After 0.1 to 0.2 s (holding time) the juice reward was delivered according to the chosen option’s reward 913 
magnitude and probability. A further 1 s (association period) followed to reinforce the association between chosen cue 914 
and reward. b, Psychometric elicitation of CEs. Left: three example gambles with different reward probabilities (p=0.3, 915 
p=0.5, p=0.7) paired with varying safe magnitudes to elicit each gamble’s CE. Right: each point represents the 916 
probability of choosing the safe option in choices between a fixed gamble (identified by the color) and a varying safe 917 
magnitude (horizontal axis). Lines are psychometric curves obtained by fitting a softmax function to the choice ratios. 918 
Each line is associated to one specific gamble, and identifies its CE as the magnitude corresponding to a choice ratio 919 
of 0.5 (vertical dashed line). c, Task conditions. The CEs were elicited using two sequence structures: in the MIXED 920 
condition different gambles and different safe options were randomly intermixed, while in the REPEATED condition the 921 
CE measurement for one gamble was completed before presenting a different gamble. d, Temporal sequence of the 922 
presented gamble EV in the two elicitation conditions for one sample session (first 200 trials). The trial-by-trial variation 923 
of the gamble EV highlights the difference in sequence structure between MIXED (red) and REPEATED (blue) 924 
conditions. e, Variability of gamble EV across consecutive trials. Absolute value of the gamble EV difference (mean ± 925 
SEM) between two consecutive trials, showing the main distinction between the two elicitation sequences: the previous 926 
trials’ gamble EV was consistently different from the current one in the MIXED condition, while it stayed constant in the 927 
REPEATED condition. Asterisk indicates significant difference (t-test, p<0.05) between conditions. 928 
 929 
Figure 2. Basic choice behavior and estimation of certainty equivalents. a, Logistic regression of choice behavior. Four 930 
task variables (gamble EV, safe EV (magnitude), risk variance, gamble position) were used as regressors for the 931 
gamble choice. Positive standardized coefficients for gamble EV and risk indicated that monkeys preferred gambles 932 
with higher EV to gambles with lower EV, and more risky gambles to less risky ones. Negative coefficient for safe EV 933 
confirmed that monkeys preferred higher reward magnitudes to lower ones. The positive position factor for one monkey 934 
indicated a side bias, that was taken into account by repeating all choice pairs with inverted left-right positions. b, 935 
Psychometric estimation of CEs. CEs of two example gambles with probabilities 0.1 (top) and 0.8 (bottom), estimated 936 
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in the two different elicitation sequences: MIXED (red) and REPEATED (blue) sequences. The percentages of safe 937 
choices as a function of safe magnitude (circles) were fitted to softmax functions (curves). Vertical lines indicate the 938 
gambles EVs (dashed lines); filled circles indicate the CEs. In both monkeys, low probability gambles (top) had a lower 939 
CE in the REPEATED condition than in the MIXED condition, where the CEs were consistently higher than the EVs, 940 
indicating a risk seeking attitude. High probability gambles (bottom) showed the inverse pattern, indicating a risk 941 
seeking behavior only in the REPEATED condition. c, Pattern of CEs across the two elicitation sequences (MIXED vs. 942 
REPEATED). Single sessions’ CEs (small data points) and average CEs across sessions (large data points) plotted as 943 
a function of gamble EV, with cubic spline interpolated curves. The full pattern of CEs shows a smooth transition from 944 
low to high probability gambles in terms of CE difference across the two elicitation sequences. For low probability 945 
gambles, both monkeys showed higher CEs in the MIXED than in the REPEATED conditions; when increasing gamble 946 
probabilities, the CE difference across conditions gradually reduced and inverted, resulting in lower CEs in the MIXED 947 
than in the REPEATED condition for high reward probabilities. Single sessions’ data points were shifted horizontally 948 
(REPEATED condition: left; MIXED condition: right) for visualization purpose. d, Response times. Mean RT (± SEM 949 
across sessions) in the two elicitation conditions. RT for monkey A were similar in the two conditions (RT difference = 950 
3.0 ms, t(9088)=-0.59 p=0.56); Monkey B showed faster response in the MIXED condition compared to the REPEATED 951 
condition (RT difference = 30.0 ms, t(22233)=-15.88 p=1.77×10-56). See Figure 2-1 for RT as a function of the options’ 952 
EV. 953 
 954 
Figure 2-1. Response time vs EV. Top: Mean RT (± SEM across sessions) as a function of EV difference between the 955 
two presented options (gamble EV – safe magnitude). Choices between options with similar EV produced higher RT. 956 
Bottom: Mean RT (± SEM across sessions) as a function of the EV of the chosen option. Faster RTs were associated 957 
to higher EV of the chosen option, while slower RTs corresponded to choices where a low EV option was selected. 958 
 959 
Figure 3. Choice model selection and validation. a, Goodness-of-fit for choice behavior using four models with different 960 
probability weighting functions. Bars represent mean BIC values (±SEM) across all sessions (Monkey A: N=56; Monkey 961 
B: N=59). BIC scores for daily parametric fits differed significantly across models (one-factor ANOVA with repeated 962 
measures, Monkey A: F(3,150)=8.32, pGGc=3.1×10-3; Monkey B: F(3,174)=13.575, pGGc=5.3×10-08). Lower BIC 963 
values for the Prelec weighting functions (Tversky, Prelec-1) indicate a better fit of the data compared to the one-964 
parameter Tversky or two-parameter Gonzalez functions. BIC values for all model pairs except for Prelec-1 vs Prelec-965 
2, Prelec-1 vs Gonzalez, and Prelec-2 vs Gonzalez in Monkey A, and the Prelec-2 vs Gonzalez in monkey B, were 966 
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significantly different (post-hoc analysis, p<0.05) for both monkeys. The sum of squared errors in CE estimation was 967 
the lowest in the Prelec models. b, c, Validation of the parameter estimation procedure using the Prelec-1 probability 968 
weighting function. Upper plots in b and c represent the utility (left) and probability distortion (right) functions used to 969 
simulate choices; lower plots represent the functions recovered with the MLE procedure. Monte Carlo simulation of 970 
choice behavior (using the same number of trials and the same step-size for magnitude and probability as in the 971 
measured data: 9 gamble probabilities, 11 safe magnitudes, 6 trials per gamble-safe pair) was repeated 1000 times, 972 
producing the 95% confidence intervals on the parameter estimates (grey areas). Varying the utility function parameter 973 
(ρ, 0.2 to 3) while keeping the probability distortion parameter constant (α=0.67) resulted in an unb iased estimate of 974 
the utility shape (b). The probability distortion parameter (α), varying from 0.33 to 3 while keeping the utility shape fixed 975 
(ρ=2), was recovered consistently and without bias (c). d, Modeled vs measured choice behavior. Comparison of 976 
estimated (curves) and measured (circles) percentage of safe choices as a function of safe magnitude, for two example 977 
gambles (probabilities 0.2 and 0.8); see Figure 3-1 for the full dataset. Estimated choice percentages were computed 978 
using the discrete choice model with the MLE-recovered parameters (Eq. 3, using the Prelec-1 probability weighting 979 
function). Estimated CEs are represented as red and blue points, EVs as vertical dashed lines. The estimated 980 
psychometric functions closely approximated the measured data points, and differences in estimated CEs across 981 
conditions are compatible with the observed data for both low and high probabilities (see Fig. 2b). 982 
 983 
Extended Data Figure 3-1. Modeled vs measured choice behavior. Comparison of estimated (curves) and measured 984 
(circles) percentage of safe choices as a function of safe magnitude. Conventions and symbols as in Fig. 3d. Thin lines 985 
represent differences between estimated and experimental data percentages, with the horizontal line (at 0.5 on the y 986 
axis) corresponding to perfect estimate (difference=0). 987 
 988 
Figure 4. Utility and probability distortion functions in two elicitation conditions. a, Model parameter estimates (mean ± 989 
SEM across sessions) in the MIXED (red) and REPEATED (blue) conditions. Asterisks indicate significant differences 990 
across conditions (MANOVA). The probability distortion parameter (α) consistently varied across sequence structures 991 
in both monkeys: negative log-values in the MIXED condition corresponded to inverse S-shaped probability distortion 992 
(α<1), while positive log-values in the REPEATED condition implied S-shaped probability distortion (α>1). Numbers 993 
below the bars represent effect sizes (Cohen’s d). The utility (ρ) and softmax (λ) parameters significantly differed across 994 
conditions only for one monkey, with a smaller effect size compared to the probability distortion parameter. b, Shapes 995 
of the probability distortion function (left) and utility function (right) corresponding to the estimated parameters, 996 
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displaying the consistent difference in subjective probability evaluation across conditions for both monkeys. c, Two-997 
dimensional representation of the utility and probability distortion parameter estimates. The dots represent the 998 
simultaneously estimated utility (ρ) and probability distortion (α) parameters for single behavioral sessions, with 95% 999 
confidence ellipses. 1000 
 1001 
Figure 5. Indifference lines in the Marshack-Machina triangle modeling different patterns of probability distortion. a, 1002 
Representation of gambles in the Marshack-Machina triangle. Schematic representation of a three-outcome gamble 1003 
(left): probabilistic combination (p1, p2, p3) of three fixed magnitudes (m1=0 ml, m2=0.25 ml, m3=0.50 ml) which can be 1004 
represented in the Marshack-Machina triangle (right, with example gambles corresponding to points on the triangle 1005 
edges). The grey line in the triangle connects points with equal expected value (EV=0.25 ml). b, Procedure for the 1006 
psychometric measurement of one indifference line. An indifference point (top, blue dot) in choices between a fixed 1007 
gamble A and different gambles Bi, circles) was defined as the point on the triangle hypotenuse for which a softmax 1008 
function fitted on the ratio of A over Bi choices equated 0.5 (bottom). An indifference line was then constructed by 1009 
connecting such indifference point on the hypotenuse to the fixed gamble A (blue line). c, Theoretical indifference lines. 1010 
Indifference lines predicted by cumulative prospect theory, for different underlying shapes of utility (u(m), power 1011 
function) and probability distortion (w(p), Prelec-1 function). Each plot shows the indifference lines corresponding to a 1012 
particular combination of u and w shapes, represented with orange and purple lines respectively. The shape of the 1013 
utility function (linear in the first row of plots, concave and convex in the other two rows) changes the global orientation 1014 
of the indifference lines, without affecting their fanning direction. On the contrary, a change in probability distortion 1015 
shape corresponds to a change in the fanning direction of indifference lines: a linear probability distortion (first column) 1016 
produces parallel indifference lines, while S-shaped (second column) and inverse S-shaped (third column) probability 1017 
distortions correspond to indifference lines fanning-in and fanning-out respectively, regardless of the utility function 1018 
shape. 1019 
 1020 
Figure 6. Effect of CE elicitation sequences on the Marshack-Machina triangle indifference lines. a, Modeled (left) and 1021 
measured (right) patterns of indifference lines across conditions. The arrows indicate the direction and amount of shift 1022 
for three sample indifference points between the MIXED (red) and REPEATED (blue) conditions, highlighting how the 1023 
model correctly predicted the effect of condition change. The grey line connects points with the same expected value 1024 
(EV=0.25 ml), representing an indifference line in case of risk-neutral behavior. Numbers define indices for the 1025 
indifference lines, corresponding to fixed gambles on the triangle edges (black dots, also represented as visual cues). 1026 
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b, Fanning direction of the indifference lines. Points represent the slope of indifference lines (angle between each line 1027 
and the horizontal axis) as a function of indifference line index (circles: model; dots: experimental data). Lines represent 1028 
linear regressions, separately computed on the two task conditions for model (dashed lines) and data points (continuous 1029 
lines). A regression line with negative slope corresponds to a decrease in indifference lines angle, indicating fanning-1030 
out; conversely, a positive regression coefficient indicates fanning-in of indifference lines. c, Statistical comparison 1031 
between model and experimental data. Shift in location of indifference points across elicitation sequences (average 1032 
difference ± SEM). A linear regression between the modeled and measured shifts (inset) confirmed the match between 1033 
model and data in terms of predicted shift in indifference points, corresponding to a correct prediction of the change in 1034 
the fanning direction across conditions. 1035 
 1036 
Figure 7. Sequence-dependent effects of trial history on probability distortion shape. a, Influence of past trials on 1037 
current trial’s choice. Standardized regression coefficients (mean ± SEM across sessions) for current trial’s gamble EV, 1038 
safe reward magnitude and previous trials’ gamble EV (up to eight trials in the past). Asterisks represent coefficients 1039 
significantly different from zero: for both monkeys, the choice behavior depended on at least one trial in the past. 1040 
Positive regression coefficients indicated that an increase in the previous trial’s gamble EV induced the monkeys to 1041 
choose the current trial’s gamble option more frequently. b, Effect of the past outcomes on gamble choices. 1042 
Standardized regression coefficients (mean ± SEM across sessions) for gamble EV, safe magnitude, previous trial’s 1043 
gamble outcome (0 ml or 0.5 ml) and gamble position. A significant positive coefficient for the previous outcome 1044 
indicated that monkeys chose the gamble more often when the previously chosen gamble was successful (0.5 ml) than 1045 
when it was not successful (0 ml): the gamble was chosen more after a win than after a loss. In terms of BIC score this 1046 
model (Eq. 15) was at least as good at describing the choice data when compared to the model with no past trials’ 1047 
influence (Eq. 2) (Monkey A: BIC2=84.2, BIC14=82.3, t-test: p=0.14; Monkey B: BIC2=221.4, BIC14=215.8, t-test: 1048 
p=5.8×10-5). c, Effect of past outcomes on the utility and probability distortion functions. The utility function appeared 1049 
more convex following a gamble-win trial (0.5 ml reward) than following a loss (no reward), suggesting that gamble 1050 
outcomes had an influence on the relative value of gamble and safe options on the next trial. The utility parameter 1051 
estimates followind win and loss trials are indicated as αW and αL respectively, while probability distortion parameter 1052 
as ρW and ρL respectively. The arrows highlight the change in the utility parameter between loss and win trials. Error 1053 
bars represent the 95% confidence intervals of the parameter estimates. d, Simulated effect of EV upgdate mechanism 1054 
based on past outcomes. Mean ± SEM across simulated sessions (N=50) of the CE resulting from choices simulated 1055 
using the learning model (Eq. 16) in MIXED and REPEATED conditions. The parameters used in the simulation were 1056 
recovered from the MLE procedure with the same model separately for each monkey. Linear probability weighting and 1057 
46 
 
linear magnitude coding were used in the simulation, demonstrating that an EV update mechanism interacting with the 1058 
local trial structure could explain the observed change in risk attitudes across conditions without explicitly introducing 1059 
a non-linear probability distortion. 1060 









